Proceedings of the Society for Computation in Linguistics
Volume 3

Article 3

2020

Modeling Behavior in Truth Value Judgment Task Experiments
Brandon Waldon
Stanford University, bwaldon@stanford.edu

Judith Degen
Stanford University, jdegen@stanford.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/scil
Part of the Computational Linguistics Commons, Psycholinguistics and Neurolinguistics Commons,
and the Semantics and Pragmatics Commons

Recommended Citation
Waldon, Brandon and Degen, Judith (2020) "Modeling Behavior in Truth Value Judgment Task
Experiments," Proceedings of the Society for Computation in Linguistics: Vol. 3 , Article 3.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/sg32-aq30
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/scil/vol3/iss1/3

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Proceedings of the Society for Computation in Linguistics by an authorized editor of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

Modeling Behavior in Truth Value Judgment Task Experiments
Brandon Waldon
Stanford University
bwaldon@stanford.edu

Abstract
Truth Value Judgment Task experiments
(TVJTs) are a common means of investigating pragmatic competence, particularly with
regards to scalar inference. We present a novel
quantitative linking function from pragmatic
competence to participant behavior on TVJTs,
based upon a Bayesian probabilistic model
of linguistic production. Our model captures
a range of observed phenomena on TVJTs,
including intermediate responses on a nonbinary scale, population and individual-level
variation, participant endorsement of false utterances, and variation in response due to socalled scalar diversity.
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Introduction

In Truth Value Judgment Task experiments
(TJVTs), participants are asked whether a given
sentence is, e.g., ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ (or ‘true’ or
‘false’, etc.), often in a context of evaluation. In
the field of experimental pragmatics, participant
judgments in TVJT paradigms have been particularly important for investigating pragmatic competence, especially as it relates to scalar implicature (Noveck, 2001; Noveck and Posada, 2003;
Bott and Noveck, 2004; De Neys and Schaeken,
2007; Geurts and Pouscoulous, 2009; Chemla and
Spector, 2011; Degen and Goodman, 2014; Degen and Tanenhaus, 2015). On the traditional view
of pragmatic competence and its link to TVJT responses, scalar implicature is assumed - following
Grice (1975) - to be a binary and categorical phenomenon, in the sense that a given utterance is assumed to categorically either give rise to an implicature or not, depending on contextual, cognitive,
and linguistic factors. To experimentalists operating on this assumption, a participant’s judgment
on a particular trial in a TVJT reflects whether or
not a scalar implicature was computed in context.

Judith Degen
Stanford University
jdegen@stanford.edu

For example, a ‘wrong’ judgment of the sentence John ate pizza or a sandwich, in a context in
which the stronger utterance alternative John ate
pizza and a sandwich is true and equally relevant,
is typically interpreted as a “pragmatic” judgment:
participants must have recognized that in such a
context, the or-sentence is true yet underinformative. Pragmatically enriching it to John didn’t eat
both pizza and a sandwich via scalar inference
makes it contextually false. Conversely, an answer
of ‘right’ on this view reflects a “literal” semantic
interpretation whereby the implicature is not computed (i.e. John ate pizza or a sandwich - and possibly both).
This linking assumption underpins the vast majority of TVJT literature relating to scalar inference (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou and Musolino,
2003; Geurts and Pouscoulous, 2009; Doran et al.,
2012; Potts et al., 2015). In an early example, Papafragou and Musolino (2003) observe that children accept true but underinformative sentences in
a TVJT at a relatively high rate relative to adults,
and that this rate is modulated by the particular
linguistic scale invoked on a given trial of the experiment (i.e. some/all vs. finish/start vs. cardinal
numbers). The authors argue from this result that
scalar implicature computation is dependent upon
linguistic scale as well as on a child’s recognition
of the communicative goals of her interlocutor.
Though widely employed, this linking assumption for TVJTs is associated with a host of problems discussed by Jasbi et al. (2019). Following those authors as well as Tanenhaus (2004),
we take these open problems to be indicative of
a larger issue in linguistics, namely that the linking hypotheses which bridge linguistic theory and
experimentally-elicited behavior are often underdeveloped, underspecified, or (in some cases) absent in experimental studies. In the service of
providing a proof of concept for how this is-
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sue may be addressed by future researchers, we
propose and evaluate a novel account of participant response in TVJT paradigms based on an explicit and quantitatively specified linking function
rooted in a probabilistic theory of pragmatic competence. The general idea is that participants’ responses in TVJT experiments are related to the
probability with which a cooperative pragmatic
speaker would have produced the observed utterance (e.g., John ate pizza or a sandwich) in order to communicate the meaning presented to participants as fact (e.g., that John ate both pizza
and a sandwich). This probabilistic production
based view departs substantially from the previous
widespread assumption that truth-value judgments
are a measure of interpretation.

kind of variation is largely absent from the experimental scalar implicature literature.
Scalar diversity: Doran et al. (2012), following
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) inter alia, report
that judgments of true but underinformative sentences vary according to the particular linguistic
material contained within the sentence, in particular the relevant linguistic scale. They conclude
that variation among scalar implicatures is a function of the scale itself (see also van Tiel et al. 2014
for further support for scale-based scalar diversity
in a non-TVJT paradigm).
Whether this variation is truly due to inherent
features of the linguistic scale (or, e.g., prior world
knowledge, or other linguistic material, or other
confounding features of the experimental context)
is an open question which warrants investigation
beyond the scope of this paper. Below, we analyze data from a TVJT where different rates of
exhaustive interpretation were observed between
a putative lexical scale (<and, or>) and a putative
ad-hoc, context-dependent pragmatic scale. Our
analysis of the data suggests that in this instance,
(at least some) variation at the level of linguistic
scale may be reduced to more general aspects of
pragmatic competence.

Before turning to the specifics of the account,
we briefly review some of the open problems in
the TVJT literature that motivate the re-thinking
of linking functions in TVJT paradigms:
Intermediate judgments: When provided
more than two response options in a TVJT, a sizable proportion of participants rates underinformative sentences using the intermediate response
options - for example, as only ‘kind of [right
/ wrong]’, or ‘neither [right nor wrong]’. Katsos and Bishop (2011), for example, provided
participants with three response options and observed substantial selection of the intermediate option. They interpreted the choice of this intermediate option as being the result of the computation of an implicature, but a priori, there is
no reason to favor this linking assumption over
one whereby the intermediate response is associated with a literal semantic interpretation. More
generally, it is not clear how the outputs of a binary model of scalar implicature (i.e. implicature
or ¬implicature) should relate to non-binary responses on TVJTs.

Endorsement of false utterances: Invariably,
a proportion of participants in TVJTs accepts
strictly false sentences. For example, in the study
we analyze below, a substantial number of participants rated conjunctions A ^ B as partially
correct in contexts where only A was true. The
most common approaches to this type of data
are either to use it as the basis of an exclusion criterion or to simply consider it meaningless noise. Doran et al. (2012), for example, exclude participants whose performance deviates by
more than two standard deviations from the mean
response on ‘control’ sentences whose semantic
contents are consistent with the context of evaluation (and which do not admit of potentially contradictory pragmatic enrichments) or whose semantic contents contradict the context. Katsos and
Bishop (2011) report that 2.5% of false sentences
in their experiment were endorsed by child participants. On the standard linking assumption, these
data are difficult to make sense of, but we will
show that they are within the scope of a satisfactory analysis of TVJT behavior.

Population-level variation: In order to explain
behavioral variation in contexts where one expects
a scalar inference, an adherent to the categorical
view of scalar implicature must stipulate that a)
not all participants calculated the implicature; or
b) some participants who calculated the implicature showed divergent behavior due to some independent mechanism which masked the ‘correct’
implicature behavior; or some combination of (a)
and (b). However, and despite the prevalence of
variation at the population level in reported TVJT
experiments, even a qualitative analysis of this

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we summarize the results
11

Condition
Binary
Ternary
Quaternary
Quinary

Response Options
‘Right’, ‘Wrong’
‘Right’, ‘Neither’, ‘Wrong’
‘Right’,
‘Kinda
Right’,
Wrong’,‘Wrong’

‘Kinda

‘Right’, ‘Kinda Right’, ‘Neither’, ‘Kinda
Wrong’, ‘Wrong’

Table 2: Cards used in Jasbi et al. (2019)’s TVJT.

Table 1:
Response-option conditions of Jasbi et
al. (2019)’s TVJT study.

(e.g., There is a cat or a dog). Card types were
crossed with guess types in this study such that a
card containing an animal X could be presented
with a guess of There is an X, There is an X or a Y
(where Y is some animal distinct from X), There is
an X and a Y, or There is a Y; cards containing two
animals X and Y could be presented with a guess
of There is an X, There is an X or a Y, There is an
X and a Y, or There is a Z (where Z is some animal
distinct from X and Y).
The researchers elicited 3 judgments per participant for each combination of card and guess type.

of a recently reported TVJT study that exemplifies the features discussed above: intermediate
judgments, population-level variation, scalar diversity, and participant endorsement of false utterances. Section 3 presents our novel quantitative model of the data from that study. Building
on insights from the Bayesian probabilistic literature on pragmatic competence (Frank and Goodman, 2012; Goodman and Stuhlmüller, 2013), we
model participants as making judgments about a
soft-optimal pragmatic speaker whose production
choices are a function of utterances’ contextual informativeness. On our analysis, participants furthermore expect that the speaker sometimes produce strictly false utterances that are nonetheless
somewhat contextually useful. We show that this
analysis provides broader empirical coverage over
the traditional assumptions discussed above.1

2

2.2

Results and Discussion

Proportions of responses for each card-guess type
in each response-option condition are shown in
Figure 1, with rows presenting behavior aggregated across one and two-card conditions.
The results of the study illustrate the several open empirical issues associated with TVJTs
more generally. First, participants routinely reported intermediate judgments between ‘Right’
and ‘Wrong’ in those conditions where intermediate response options were available. In the Quaternary and Quinary response-option conditions,
for example, the intermediate judgment of ‘Kinda
Right’ was the single most-selected response option in two-animal card conditions where Bob’s
guess was true but underinformative (i.e. either
a simple delcarative or a disjunction).
The results also exemplify the issue of
population-level variation: for example, although behavioral patterns are otherwise fairly
categorical in the Binary condition, participant
judgments were roughly split between ‘Right’ and
‘Wrong’ for underinformative uses of disjunction on two-animal card conditions. A visual inspection of the results suggests even more variation in the population as number of response options increase. The authors furthermore reported
individual-level variation: qualitatively similar
trials (e.g. two trials involving underinformative disjunction) sometimes received different re-

TVJT Data

2.1 Experiment Materials, Design and
Procedure
Jasbi et al. (2019) report the results of a TVJT designed to test whether linking hypothesis and number of response options modulate the researcher’s
inferences about scalar implicature rates. In their
study, number of response options varied between
two and five as a between-subjects manipulation.
Conditions are summarized in Figure 1. Participants (n = 200) were first shown six cards (Table
2) featuring one or two of the following animals: a
cat, a dog, and an elephant. On every trial, participants saw one of the six cards, and a blindfolded
cartoon character Bob made guesses as to what animals were on the card. Participants were asked
to rate Bob’s guesses using the response options
available in their particular condition.
Bob made the following guess types: simple
declaratives (e.g., There is a cat), conjunctions
(e.g., There is a cat and a dog), and disjunctions
1
Data and code for all analyses and graphs are available
at http://github.com/bwaldon/tvjt_linking.
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Figure 1: Model predictions (light bars) plotted against empirical results (dark bars) from Jasbi et al.’s (2019)
TVJT study. Error bars indicate 95% multinomial confidence intervals. Red and green bars indicate false and true
trials, respectively; blue bars indicate implicature trials.

sponses from the same participant.
Comparison of judgments of true but underinformative simple declaratives (i.e. There is an X)
to judgments of true but underinformative disjunctions (i.e. There is an X or a Y) on two-animal
card conditions revealed some amount of scalar
diversity. Following Horn (1972), exposure to the
disjunctive connective or canonically activates an
informationally-stronger scalemate and as a pragmatic alternative to give rise to an exclusive interpretation. In contrast, the pragmatic scale in
the case of the simple declarative is constructed
in a more context-dependent manner. To illustrate, in a two-animal card context where the card
features both a cat and a dog, the listener considers a partially-ordered pragmatic scale of cat and
dog, cat, and dog, where the conjunction outranks
its scalemates in terms of informational strength.
Thus, an utterance of cat activates cat and dog as
an alternative to give rise to an the exhaustive interpretation (There is only a cat on the card).
In the Binary and Ternary conditions, under-

informative uses of or resulted in substantially
higher rates of ‘Wrong’ responses than did underinformative simple declaratives, suggesting that
at the population level, or was interpreted more
exhaustively than the simple declarative. However, this pattern was reversed in the Quaternary
and Quinary conditions, in which underinformative simple declaratives were more likely to be
considered only ‘Kinda Right’ and less likely to be
considered simply ‘Right’ compared to underinformative disjunctions. This pattern suggests that
in the Quaternary and Quinary conditions, simple
declaratives were interpreted more exhaustively
than disjunctions.
Finally, the data in the Quaternary and Quinary
conditions also reveal substantial participant endorsement of false utterances. Note specifically that in one-animal card trials, the conjunctive
guess (e.g. cat and dog) is strictly false; thus, we
might naı̈vely expect a priori that participants categorically judge these utterances to be ‘Wrong’ in
all conditions. Yet when given the option to rate
13

this sentence ‘Kinda Right’ or ‘Kinda Wrong’,
participants often did so. In all other conditions
where the utterance was strictly false (e.g. a guess
of elephant for a card containing a cat or a cat and
dog), behavior was effectively categorical. That is,
rates of endorsement of false utterances varied according to the particular way in which the sentence
was false in context.
In sum, the data collected by Jasbi et al. (2019)
reflect a range of behavioral patterns unaccounted
for by the traditional categorical view of scalar
inference and corresponding standard linking assumptions. Below, we report an analysis of their
data that aims to predict these phenomena.

3

matic inferences are not categorical computations
of enriched meanings over the semantic denotations of utterances. For example, exclusive interpretations of or are represented in RSA as a positive shift in the posterior probability of an exclusive meaning, relative to its prior probability.
In other words, ‘implicature’ is not a theoretical construct in the RSA framework, absent additional stipulations regarding how to go from probability distributions to binary, categorical inferences. This is an advantage: providing a probabilistic representation of both the speaker’s utterance choices and the listener’s resulting posterior
beliefs after observing an utterance puts us one
step closer to accounting for the quantitative behavioral patterns observed in tasks such as TVJTs.

Analysis

3.1 Cognitive model

3.2

Our analysis implements a proposal outlined by
Jasbi et al. (2019), couched in the Rational
Speech Act (RSA) framework (Frank and Goodman, 2012; Goodman and Stuhlmüller, 2013).
RSA provides a Bayesian, probabilistic account
of pragmatic competence. In RSA, the pragmatic
inferences drawn by listeners are represented as
probability distributions over meanings which the
speaker plausibly intended to convey with a given
observed utterance. The probability of this listener (L1 ) attributing an intended meaning m to a
speaker who produces an utterance u is calculated
from a prior probability distribution over potential
world states Pw as well as from L1 ’s expectations
about the linguistic behavior of the speaker S1 .

Behavioral model

Jasbi et al. (2019) proposed but did not systematically test a simple linking hypothesis: rather
than providing one response if an implicature is
computed and another if it isn’t, a participant in
a TVJT experiment provides a particular response
to an utterance u if the probability of u given a
meaning represented by m lies within a particular
probability interval on the distribution PS1 (u|m).2
The participant is modeled as a responder R, who
in a binary forced-choice task between ‘Right’
and ‘Wrong’ responds ‘Right’ to an utterance u in
world m just in case PS1 (u|m) meets or exceeds
some probability(threshold ✓:
‘Right’
iff PS1 (u|m) ✓
R(u, m, ✓) =
‘Wrong’ otherwise

PL1 (m|u) / PS1 (u|m) · Pw (m)

The model is extended straightforwardly to an
experiment in which participants have a third response option (e.g. ‘Neither’), as in the Ternary
condition. In this case, the model specifies two
probability thresholds: ✓1 , the minimum standard
for an utterance in a given world state to count as
‘Right’, and ✓2 , the minimum standard for ‘Neither’. Thus, in8
the Ternary condition:
>
iff PS1 (u|m) ✓1
<‘Right’
R(u, m, ✓) = ‘Neither’ iff ✓1 > PS1 (u|m) ✓2
>
:
‘Wrong’ otherwise
Applying a similar logic allows for the specification of linking hypotheses for TVJTs with an

PS1 is modeled as a probability distribution over
possible utterances given the speaker’s communicative intentions m. This speaker produces utterances that soft-maximize utility, where utility
is defined via a tradeoff between an utterance’s
cost C and its contextual informativeness, calculated from the representation of a literal listener L0
whose interpretation of an utterance u is in turn a
function of the truth conditional meaning [[u]](m)
and of her prior expectations Pw (m) regarding the
likelihood of possible world states. The extent to
which the speaker maximizes utility is modulated
by a parameter ↵ – the greater ↵, the more the
speaker produces utterances that maximize utility.

2
Following Degen and Goodman (2014), the authors argue that conceptually, behavior on TVJTs is better modeled
as a function of an agent’s representation of a pragmatic
speaker rather than of a pragmatic listener.

PS1 (u|m) / e↵(ln L0 (m|u) C(u))
PL0 (m|u) / [[u]](m) · Pw (m)
In RSA (and contra the traditional view), prag14

arbitrary number of response options.
The intuition behind the threshold model is as
follows: participants should disprefer utterances
that are relatively unexpected. Thus, high S1 production probability for a given utterance in context
makes it more likely that the utterance receives a
positive evaluation in the TVJT – expressed by
ordered response options above ‘Wrong’. Conversely, the more unexpected an utterance is, the
more likely it is to be judged as ‘Wrong’. Underinformative utterances of the sort that have traditionally been used to assess ‘implicature rates’ are precisely the kinds of utterances that are unexpected
from informative speakers and are therefore likely
to be rated as ‘Wrong’.
Here, we assess the quality of this linking hypothesis on the dataset from Jasbi et al. (2019).
To that end, we first specify the space of possible meanings and utterances that inform a participant’s pragmatic competence in this task. We assume that participants have uniform prior expectations of seeing any of the six possible cards in the
experiment. We further assume that participants
have uniform prior expectations of a speaker producing any of the four utterance types with which
a card may have been crossed. For example, if
the card featured either just a cat or both a cat and
a dog, we represent the participant as having uniform prior expectations of a speaker producing the
guesses elephant, cat, dog, cat and dog, or cat or
dog (that is, we do not posit a cost asymmetry between possible utterances).3
For illustrative purposes, the ‘Simple Bayesian’
bars in Figure 2 display marginal distributions
over possible utterances produced by S1 given
these assumptions for the utterance and meanings
priors, as well as an arbitary value of 1 for the optimality parameter ↵, and given that the speaker
intends either to communicate the meaning that
(just) a cat is on the card or that both a cat and
a dog are. The speaker distributions reveal two
conceptual issues for the threshold response model
proposed by Jasbi et al (2019).
First, the probability of S1 producing the strictly
false guess of cat and dog should be zero if the
card contains just a cat. This is because the literal listener probability PL0 of inferring the ‘only
cat’ meaning given cat and dog is zero by virtue

of the fact that the utterance is strictly false in this
world state. Thus, any model of response that is
a function of PS1 as specified predicts that participants categorically rate the cat and dog guess as
‘Wrong’ in this context, contrary to what is observed in the Quaternary and Quinary conditions.
Second, the probability of producing disjunctions is lower than the probability of producing simple declarative guesses in two-animal card
contexts. This asymmetry is advantageous in
the case of the Binary and Ternary response
data: assuming a threshold for ‘Right’ positioned between PS1 (cat or dog|cat and dog) and
PS1 (cat|cat and dog), we predict correctly that
underinformative simple declaratives should be
judged ‘Right’ more often than underinformative
disjunctions. But the asymmetry in S1 probabilities therefore predicts the wrong pattern of responses on corresponding trials in the Quaternary
and Quinary conditions.
We argue that these two seemingly disparate
issues can be mediated by a common solution.
In particular, we propose a revision to the simple Bayesian inference story above, whereby
pragmatically-competent listeners either expect
speaker productions as directly sampled from the
PS1 distribution, or that those utterance production
probabilities inform a second conditional probability distribution of utterances given utterances,
the ‘Partial Truth’ utterance distribution PSP T :
P
PSP T (u0 |u) /
PS1 (u0 |m)4
m2JuK

The ‘Partial Truth’ distribution is a generalized
way of modeling a speaker who makes assertions
that are sometimes strictly false in light of her intended meaning. Recall that the semantic content of any possible utterance choice made by S1
is a set of possible worlds and is therefore consistent with meanings unintended by the speaker.
SP T models the speaker’s soft-optimal production probabilities given these unintended meanings, renormalizing the pragmatic speaker’s production probabilities over all possible worlds consistent with utterance choices sampled from PS1 .
4

For our implementation of SP T , we restrict the distribution such that u0 must entail (or be entailed by) u in order to
have probability above 0. Without this restriction, SP T could
in principle assign high probability to utterances which have
no relevance to the question under discussion (i.e. “What animals are on the card?”), by virtue of those utterances’ assertability in worlds consistent with u. A systematic exploration
of the linguistic alternatives available to S1 (as well as SP T )
is a question we must leave to future work.

3
We include dog as a possible guess because we posit
that participants have no reason a priori to expect the other
true and underinformative simple declarative - cat - over this
equally informative guess in two-animal card conditions.
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greater probability to a guess of cat or dog in twoanimal contexts and down-weights the probability
of producing simply cat: the optimal utterance in
this context (cat and dog) is consistent with several world states in which the disjunction cat or
dog is assertable and with relativley fewer worlds
in which cat is assertable.
3.3

Quantitative model evaluation

We now turn to a quantitative assessment of the
threshold model of response, having addressed
two ways in which the unenriched S1 representation would fail to qualitatively capture behavioral patterns in Jasbi et al (2019)’s TVJT study.
Additionally, following Jasbi et al., we recognize
that if threshold values were made to be completely invariant across trials of the experiment,
then the model would make the undesirable prediction that every participant should have exactly
the same response in a given trial type. To allow
for population-level variation, the model responder makes a response by comparing the speaker
probability against thresholds that are generated
from sampling from Gaussian distributions. We
thus allow for both population-level and individual
level-variation, on the assumption that this sampling procedure takes place whenever a participant
is asked to evaluate an utterance in the TVJT.8
In order to evaluate the RSA-based threshold model, we conducted a Bayesian data analysis. This allowed us to simultaneously generate
model predictions and infer likely parameter values, by conditioning on the TVJT data from Jasbi
et al. (separately for each of the four responseoption conditions of the experiment) and integrating over the free parameters. Each model assumes
uniform priors over utterances and world states as
above. We infer the Gaussian threshold distribution parameters and alpha optimality parameters
from uniform priors over parameter values using
MCMC sampling (observing - for every sample
of possible parameter values the expected proportion of responses in that trial type and comparing
that distribution to the empirically-observed pattern of response).9 Additionally, for the Quater-

Figure 2: Simulated S1 production probabilities.

To illustrate: suppose a speaker intends to communicate that many (but not all) of the X are Y,
and has quantifier choices many and all. The only
possible utterance choice for the simple Bayesian
S1 speaker is many, which is semantically consistent with the intended meaning. But the lowerbounded quantifier many is also semantically consistent with an ‘all of the X are Y’ meaning, which
in turn is consistent with the utterance choice all.
By SP T , we have some nonzero expectation that
the speaker will use all to communicate the ‘many
(but not all) of the X are Y’ meaning.5 Thus, a
pragmatic listener who hears all from the ‘Partial Truth’ speaker will have a nonzero expectation
that all should receive an imprecise, non-maximal
interpretation. In other words, SP T provides a
generalized way of formalizing ‘loose-talk’ production behavior (Lasersohn, 1999).6
The ‘Partial Truth’ bars in Figure 2 visualize marginal distributions over utterances given
an arbitrary 0.6 probability that the speaker samples from the PSP T distribution after sampling
from PS1 . The ‘Partial Truth’ speaker assigns
nonzero probability to a guess of cat and dog
even when the speaker’s intended meaning is the
single-animal cat card, largely due to the fact that
the optimal guess in this context (cat) is truthconditionally consistent with a two-animal card
that makes cat and dog both true and pragmatically optimal.7 Moreover, this speaker assigns
5
The effect of this is similar to the use of QUD projection
functions for hyperbolic interpretations (Kao et al., 2014).
6
Formalizing this production behavior is different from
analyzing why imprecision exists (indeed, is pervasive) in linguistic communication. For the time being, we present this
‘loose-talk’ speaker model without a thorough assessment of
its explanatory power.
7
Because cat or dog is a possible S1 production, and this
choice lies in an entailment relation with the simple declar-

ative guess dog, we also assign some probability to dog as a
guess in this context - albeit lower probability than is assigned
to the conjunctive guess cat and dog.
8
We also introduce a random noise term in the parameter
estimation such that the simulated responder makes random
guesses on 1% of trials. This noise term is removed when
running the model forward to make predictive estimations.
9
We used WebPPL (Goodman and Stuhlmüller, 2014) for
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Binary condition
↵
µ ✓1
1.22 0.125 0.073
Ternary condition
↵
µ ✓1
1.38 0.076 0.061
Quaternary condition
↵
µ ✓1
2.75 0.159 0.277
Quinary condition
↵
µ ✓1
4.38 0.099 0.184

formative simple declaratives. The model makes
use of the ‘Partial Truth’ speaker function in order
to adjust the underlying speaker production probabilities - and hence the distribution of predicted response options - for these utterances. The ‘Partial
Truth’ function also boosts the production probability of strictly false conjunctions, allowing the
model to predict responses other than ‘Wrong’ for
this trial type. Thus, the ‘Partial Truth’ enrichment helps to address both scalar diversity and
endorsement of false utterances.11
The correlation between empirical observations
and model predictions is high (Adj. R2 > 0.9
in all conditions), suggesting that the threshold
responder model is a good model of TVJT behavior overall. Nevertheless, the model makes
some undesirable predictions. For example, it
over-predicts rates of ‘Neither’ responses in the
Quinary condition. Empirically, this response
tended to be disfavored relative to positive and
negative response options, for example in the case
of strictly false cat and dog guesses. The model
assumes that the labeling of the response options
should have no particular effect on selection, but
future work should engage with this assumption.

µ✓2
0.011
µ✓2
0.101

µ ✓3
0.048

PT
0.797

µ✓2
0.042

µ ✓3
0.005

µ✓4
0.002

PT
0.437

Table 3: MAP estimates obtained from Bayesian data
analysis, where ↵ is the optimality parameter, and
µ are Gaussian threshold distribution parameters, and
P T is the probability with which the speaker samples
from PSP T rather than directly from PS1 .

nary and Quinary conditions, we infer from a uniform prior the probability with which the speaker
samples from PSP T after sampling from PS1 . The
intuition for restricting the ‘Partial Truth’ manipulation to these conditions is that the behavioral patterns which this manipulation is intended to cover
are only observed in these conditions.10
Posterior distributions over the parameter values are displayed in Figure 3, and model predictions using maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of the parameter values (Table 3) are plotted against Jasbi et al. (2019)’s results in Figure 1. Qualitatively, the model addresses each of
the desiderata for an empirically adequate linking
function discussed above. In all conditions, the
model makes predictions for the full range of response options available to participants – thus addressing the issue of intermediate judgments. At
the same time, the model addresses the issue of
population-level variation: sampling threshold
values from Gaussian distributions allows different judgments in the population for a given utterance (while keeping the speaker production probability of that utterance constant).
Recall that in the Quaternary and Quinary conditions, there was an asymmetry in the judgment
of underinformative disjunctions versus underin-

4 Discussion and Conclusion
Based on a single underlying probabilistic model
of pragmatic competence, the presented threshold responder model provides a level of empirical coverage for TVJT data unavailable to existing
linking models rooted in the categorical view of
scalar implicature. The contribution of this paper
is twofold: methodologically, we present this analysis as a proof-of-concept approach to modeling
TVJT data for researchers in experimental semantics/pragmatics. We see the presented behavioral
model as a starting point for future quantitative analytic work in the TVJT domain – a model against
which future models may be assessed.12
On the theoretical side, the cognitive model that
forms the basis for the behavioral model is nonneutral in its assumptions. In particular, it assumes that TVJT behavior is the result of reasoning about probabilistic utterance choices that

MCMC inference, with 5000 samples (plus a lag of 10 iterations between samples) and a burn-in time of 20,000 iterations. We computed maximum a posteriori values from the
marginal posterior distributions over parameter values using
the density function in R.
10
We speculate that there may be a link between increasing
the number of response options and participants’ increased
expectation of Partial Truth speaker behavior, which may
have been strengthened by the fact that the Quaternary and
Quinary conditions explicitly made reference to gradient levels of correctness (i.e. ‘Kinda Right’ / ‘Kinda Wrong’). But
this speculation warrants future investigation.

11
We leave further investigation of the ‘Partial Truth’ function - in particular its extension to an analysis of linguistic
imprecision as sketched above - to future work.
12
For example, one could in principle link the threshold model to pragmatic listener probabilities of meanings
given utterances rather than to speaker production probabilities given intended meanings (as we do in this paper).
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Figure 3: Normalized marginal posterior distributions over parameter values for the threshold responder model in
each experimental condition. Note that the posterior distribution for the optimality parameter ↵ has been rescaled
for the purposes of this visualization.

are the result of trading off (contextual) utterance
informativeness and cost. Under this view, not
only does TVJT behavior not quantify implicature rates; the very notion of an implicature evaporates. Rather than finding this undesirable, we
believe that this framework allows for more rigorous engagement with the complexities of linking
theoretical constructs to behavior (see also Franke
2016), an area of some dearth in experimental semantics/pragmatics.
—
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